In this paper we describe a cryptanalysis of a key exchange scheme recently proposed bý Alvarez, Tortosa, Vicent and Zamora. The scheme is based on exponentiation of block matrices over a finite field of prime order. We present an efficient reduction of the problem of disclosing the shared key to the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in an extension of the base field.
Introduction
The very well known Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme [5] was the first published public key cryptographic protocol, allowing two users communicating over a public insecure channel to agree on a common shared secret key. One of the most common platform groups candidates to implement this protocol is the multiplicative group of a finite field. In this case, the problem of obtaining the shared key from the exchanged data is trivially solved if one can solve the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the finite field, but this is considered to be a computationally hard problem for appropriately chosen parameters. Some other groups have been proposed as platform groups for Diffie-Hellman-like protocols, such as the group of non-singular matrices over a finite field [12] or the group of points of an elliptic curve [7] and [11] .
Recently,Álvarez, Tortosa, Vicent and Zamora [1, 2] proposed a key exchange protocol where the platform group is the 2 × 2 block upper triangular invertible matrices over a finite field. Essentially, two high order public matrices M 1 and M 2 are generated in this group ( the authors in [1, 2] suggest using companion matrices of primitive polynomials in blocks (1, 1) and (2, 2) to maximize the order). Then the two users choose secret exponents (r, s) and (v, w) respectively, and exchange the matrices M r 1 M s 2 and M u 1 M v 2 . The shared key is the (1, 2) block of the matrix M . This is done mainly in order to avoid a reduction from the DLP in the matrix group to the DLP in the base field (see the Related work paragraph). The computational problem of recovering the private keys from the public information can thus be stated as (2EXP problem in 4.2): from the exchanged data M r 1 M s 2 and M v 1 M w 2 , compute the secret exponents r, s (or v, w).
.
Our contribution.
The main result in this paper is an efficient reduction from the 2EXP problem to the DLP in a finite extension of the base field in case companion matrices of primitive polynomials are used. This is done in three steps: first, we show how the 2EXP problem can be solved separately in the (1, 1) and (2, 2) blocks to obtain a solution for the whole problem. Second, we study the 2EXP problem when the matrices are arbitrary invertible matrices. In this case we reduce the 2EXP problem to a computational problem (2EXP* in 4.2.1) in an extension of the base field. Third, we focus on the case where the involved matrices are generated using companion matrices of primitive polynomials, as proposed in [1, 2] . In this situation we are able to reduce the 2EXP problem to solving the DLP in a finite extension of the base field. Thus we conclude that the use of this scheme offers no advantage over the original Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme. We also provide an observation about the public parameters generation (specifically, the matrices M 1 and M 2 must be chosen in a way that they do not commute) and some remarks about the order of these matrices.
Related work. As far as we now, the first attempt to using matrices over a finite field in a key exchange scheme was made by Odoni, Varadharajan and Sanders in 1984 [12] . They use an invertible matrix as a group generator and then proceed as in the usual Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. In order to get a high enough order for the generating matrix, they define a block diagonal matrix, where the blocks are similar to companion matrices of primitive polynomials (in fact, as pointed out in [9] , the authors incorrectly use irreducible polynomials instead of primitive polynomials).
After that, Menezes and Vanstone proved in 1992 [9] that the DLP in the cyclic group generated by one of these block matrices can be efficiently reduced to the DLP in an extension of the base field, thus showing that this kind of groups offers no advantage over finite fields. In a subsequent paper of 1997, Menezes and Yi-Hong Wu [10] extended this reduction to the general case, that is, they showed that the DLP in the general linear group GL n (Z Z p ) can be efficiently reduced to the DLP in certain "small" extension of the base field.
In order to avoid the Menezes and Yi-Hong Wu reduction, Climent, Ferrández, Vicent and Zamora [3] proposed in 2006 another matrix based key exchange protocol (CFVZ protocol). They use 2 × 2 block upper triangular matrices, where the diagonal blocks have integer entries while the (1,2) block has entries in the set of rational points of an elliptic curve. In this case the two parties of the protocol interchange the (1,2) block of a randomly chosen power of one of these matrices. The shared key is the (1,2) block of another matrix which they can compute with their secret data.
In 2007, Climent, Gorla and Rosenthal [4] published a cryptanalysis of this last protocol. They showed how the problem of computing the shared key can be efficiently reduced to solving several DLP's in the group associated to the elliptic curve. They also proved how solving simultaneously these DLP's problems is essentially as hard as solving one single DLP. Therefore they conclude that the CFVZ protocol offers no advantage over working in the elliptic curve group.
Paper outline. In Section 2 we introduce the subgroup of the general linear group GL n (Z Z p ) which is used in the proposed key exchange scheme. We recall how the public data is generated by using companion matrices of primitive polynomials and provide some remarks about the orders of these matrices. In Section 3 the key exchange protocol is described. Section 4 is devoted to the cryptanalysis of the scheme. First we study the general case, when the public matrices are arbitrary and then we focus on the case when they are generated by using companion matrices of primitive polynomials. In the former we reduce the problem of disclosing the secret keys to a computational problem in an extension of the base field, while in the later we show that this problem can be solved by computing discrete logarithms in that extension. Finally we summarize our conclusions in Section 5. The proofs of the claims in Section 2 are included in the Appendix.
Preliminaries
The following is a description of the underlying group structure. We describe some properties and simple consequences of the definitions, and recall the method proposed in [1, 2] for generating high order elements.
Underlying group structure
Given a prime number p and n, l ∈ IN, define the subgroup of GL n+l (Z Z p ) under matrix multiplication by
We simply write Θ when p, n and l are fixed. The following are some simple consequences of the definition: 
High order elements M from Θ:
As described in section 3, the key exchange protocol presented in [1, 2] is based on products of certain powers (the private keys) of elements M 1 , M 2 ∈ Θ. Therefore, it is important that these elements achieve a high order so that exhaustive search attacks are prevented. In [1, 2] the following method is proposed:
and A f , B g the corresponding companion matrices i.e.
and
As described, in this construction any "X-matrix" is valid, so that we assume that X may be chosen at random.
In the original papers [1, 2] , it is claimed that, with this construction, the order of M is such that ord(M ) = lcm(p n − 1, p l − 1) and if n and l are chosen to be relatively prime then ord(M ) is maximum. Next we provide a couple of remarks about these claims: 
However, if M is chosen as in 2.2 then it is true that ord(M ) = lcm(ord(A), ord(B))
We have not been able to find a demonstration of this fact in the literature therefore we include a proof of the following lemma in the Appendix. 
The key exchange protocol
Next we describe the key exchange protocol as proposed in [1, 2] .
1. Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and on n, l. Then they choose
Proof. It is easy to see that
2. The private data:
Alice: (r, s)
3. Data exchanged:
The shared key is the entry (1, 2) of M 
Security Analysis
In this section we present the security analysis and an attack on the scheme of section 3. The first subsection consists on a remark on the key generation procedure. The second subsection provides a reduction of the cryptographic problem to a related problem in an extension of the base field. The third section presents an attack on the protocol in case the entries are generated using companion matrices of primitive polynomials as is suggested by the authors of [1, 2] . We show that in this case it is possible to reduce the problem to that of computing discrete logarithms in an extension of the base field. This shows that the protocol does not offer an advantage over computation in Z Z p , since the computational cost of operations in GL n (Z Z p ) is higher than in Z Z p .
Key generation
If M 1 and M 2 commute then the shared key can be computed by
Although the probability that this happens (at least for u.a.r chosen matrices) is very small, it is obvious that the protocol should not accept this kind of keys.
Reduction to the DLP in a finite field
We will show here that, with the proposed key generation, it is possible to reduce the problem of finding the secret keys r and s, to solving a certain problem in an extension of the base field. The problem of recovering the secret key in the proposed key exchange protocol can be stated in the following way: Therefore it is enough to solve the 2EXP problem for each of the pairs (A 1 , A 2 ) and (B 1 , B 2 ) given M 1 and M 2 . The next sections will first describe the general case and then proceed to the case when these pairs of matrices are generated as in section 2.2. Note that in this case each matrix from each pair is generated using primitive polynomials of the same degree. In this last case we are able to further reduce the 2EXP problem in GL n (Z Z p ) to the DLP problem in the extension field IF p n .
The general case
We consider the Jordan normal form of A 1 , A 2 ∈ GL n (Z Z p ). More precisely, suppose the characteristic polynomial of A 1 is given by
. Then the smallest extension field containing all the eigenvalues of A 1 is the field E 1 = IF pd1 withd 1 = lcm(d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d k ) . Similarly for A 2 , the smallest extension field containing all the eigenvalues of A 2 is the field E 2 = IF pd2 with a similard 2 .
. Then it is well known that there exist P 1 ∈ GL n (E 1 ) and P 2 ∈ GL n (E 2 ) such that
2 HP 2 where J and H are the Jordan matrices of each i.e.
. . , u) are the Jordan blocks of A 1 of size k i associated to the eigenvalue λ i (resp. Jordan blocks of A 2 of size l i associated to the eigenvalue
i.e. they are the k i × k i size matrices
and the l i × l i size matrices
Note that λ 1 , . . . , λ t (resp. α 1 , . . . , α u ) need not be necessarily distinct. In [10] the authors describe an algorithm for computing the Jordan canonical form in GL n (Z Z p ) that runs in expected polynomial time.
i.e.
. This equation is in the field E.
) s , and it can be shown that entries (a, b) are given by
So for example, for 1 ≤ a ≤ k 1 and
Choosing a = k 1 and b = l 1 + 1, equations 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 imply that j = k 1 and i = l 1 + 1 so that
In general, for a(j 1 ) = computing r, s, we can also break the protocol. Therefore we reduced the original 2EXP problem to the following 2EXP* problem:
have orders a 1 and a 2 respectively, and let (λ k 1 ) and (α k 2 ) (1 ≤ k 1 , k 2 ≤ n) denote the eigenvalues of A 1 and A 2 respectively. Let also 1 ≤ r ≤ a 1 − 1 and 1 ≤ s ≤ a 2 − 1.
Given a set of elements {u ij = λ r j α s j } (in a certain extension field of Z Z p ) of size less or equal to n 2 , find r, s.
Thus we have reduced the key recovering problem to a computational problem in a finite field. Moreover, if the next two conditions (I) and (II) hold, we are able to reduce the 2EXP* problem to the DLP problem. Observing equation 4.2.4 we conclude that:
We have thus reduced the problem of retrieving the private keys to solving the DLP in a finite field if the following happens to be true: A 1 and A 2 share a common eigenvalue, and A 1 (or A 2 ) has eigenvalue 1. In general, both conditions are necessary to retrieve the private keys r, s by solving the DLP's (I) and (II). Therefore matrices satisfying (I) and (II) simultaneously should be avoided in the parameter generation procedure.
4.2.2
Note that now we have ord(A 1 ) = ord(A 2 ) = p n − 1. Suppose that A 1 and A 2 are matrices similar to companion matrices of some primitive polynomials f 1 and f 2 of degree n. Then Lemma 4.1. Proof. See for example [6] .
The eigenvalues of
In particular this means that 1 is not an eigenvalue of neither A 1 nor of A 2 and therefore the method for solving for r, s described at the end of section 4.2.1 may not necessarily apply since condition (I) is also necessary in general for solving equation 4.2.4. We will see in the following that nevertheless, in this case, retrieving the private keys r, s is no harder than solving a discrete logarithm in IF p n .
Since the Jordan matrices of A 1 and A 2 are diagonal, equation 4.2.4 becomes
Write λ = λ i and α = α j . At this we have the following situation:
1. We are considering extension fields of IF p for each root λ and α of f 1 and f 2 . Therefore,
ij w ij = λ r α s belongs to a finite extension of IF p by adjoining the roots λ and α i.e u ij ∈ IF p (λ)(α).
By the subfield criterion (see [8] Generating a new equation 4.2.5 with the same i but a different k such that f 2 (α k ) = 0 and z ik = 0 (i.e. by considering a different eigenvalue of A 2 ) we also have α k = λ
2 must have many entries different from 0. Therefore, solving the DLP system in IF p n for x j and x k , gives us another system of DLP's in IF p n :
We now need to solve this system to retrieve the private keys r and s.
Solving system 4.2.6
We suppose we were able to compute x j and x k . Suppose also without loss of generality that i = j = 1 and k = 2 (i.e. we are considering λ 1 , α 1 , α 2 ) and that u 11 = λ 
Applying reduction, we find that (x 2 − x 1 )s = y 2 − y 1 mod (p n − 1), and since the original s is a solution, we conclude that d = gcd(x 2 − x 1 , p n − 1) divides (y 2 − y 1 ). There are therefore exactly d solutions to system 4.2.7. If (x,ȳ) is such that d = (x 2 − x 1 )x + (p n − 1)ȳ then the solutions to system 4.2.7 are given by
where i = 0, . . . , d − 1. Of these d pairs (r i , s i ), one will be the original (r, s).
Depending on the chosen λ 1 , α 1 and α 2 , the number of solutions can be high, so it is clear that this choice is important for solving the system. We will show that it is always possible to choose "well" i.e. choosing λ 1 , α 1 and α 2 such that d = gcd(x 2 − x 1 , p n − 1) is small.
Choose one root λ 1 of f 1 and one root α 1 of f 2 . Because f 2 is primitive, there exists j such that α j = α 1 then λ
Therefore x 2 = p x 1 mod (p n − 1) and consequently We have thus shown that, by choosing a root λ 1 of A 1 and two "successive" roots α 1 and α j = α p 1 of A 2 , such that the corresponding z 11 and z 1j are non zero, then the number of solutions of the system 4.2.7 is p − 1. Of these, one solution is the original (r, s).
Conclusions
We have presented a cryptanalysis and an attack on the key exchange scheme proposed in [1, 2] . More precisely, we have shown that breaking the scheme can be reduced to solving a computational problem in an extension of the base field. Moreover, if the parameters M 1 and M 2 are generated using companion matrices of primitive polynomials, then this computational problem can be further reduced to a small set of discrete logarithm problems in an extension of the base field. We have also commented on the need for the protocol to make sure the parameters do not commute. We thus conclude that the scheme offers no advantage over working in the base field. and suppose also that k = q 1 a = q 2 b. Then I = B bq 2 = B aq 1 = B rq 1 and the following holds: We can repeat this process until the first remainder r i = 1, which we know will happen if gcd(a, b) = 1. We then get 
